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International Trade and Real Transmission Channels of Financial Shocks 
in Globalized Production Networks 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
For the past 20 years, globalization has implied not only the expansion of international trade and 
finance, but also the geographical fragmentation of the production processes within networks of firms 
associated through contractual arrangements or belonging to trans-national corporations. Nowadays, 
specific industrial operations, from the conception to the assembly of  final products, are no longer 
undertaken by a single establishment but increasingly outsourced within these global value chains, 
giving place to what is known as "trade in tasks" (Baldwin, 2006).  
 
It is becoming common practice for firms to send their unfinished goods to an affiliate or non affiliate 
for processing. Sometimes the material is sent to firms within the domestic economy; sometimes the 
material is sent abroad. This process is very common among processing industries such as chemical, 
electronic and metallic manufacturing. In the industry, the process is often referred to as toll 
manufacturing, toll processing or custom manufacturing. Indeed, most of the enormous growth in trade 
recorded in the last 20 years consisted in relatively similar goods (manufactures) between relatively 
similar countries; moreover, this feature is robust to the level of disaggregation: no matter how  finely 
industries are defined, a high proportion of trade takes place within industries rather than between them 
(Neary, 2009). In 2007, almost half of the world trade in merchandises, excluding oil, was attributed to 
intermediate goods. This proportion (relative to imported goods) raised to 68% for Malaysia and 61% 
for China.  
 
These linkages have been taking more and more importance in what has been called the "new 
economy", characterised by a rapid pace of technological change, and a closer integration of capital, 
labour and product markets. Vertical integration helps firms to improve their efficiency and to be able to 
react more rapidly to changes in international market situations. However, the greater interconnection 
has also provided greater and faster channels of propagation of adverse external shocks. Because 
production is internationally diversified, adverse external shocks can affect firms not only through final 
demand (a sudden decline in exports), but also through a rupture in the flow of inputs received from 
their suppliers.  
 
While the financial and macroeconomic channels of transmissions have received much attention, the 
role of industrial linkages as vectors of contagion remains to be thoroughly investigated. The disruptive 
potential of a failure in the international supply chain is becoming larger with time: trade in 
manufactures represented a quarter of the world industrial output in 2000, this proportion doubled in 
only five years. Almost 30% of this trade relates to the exchange of intermediate inputs and goods for 
processing, either traded between establishments pertaining to the same multinational enterprise, or 
exported to contracting parties for processing, then re-imported. 
 
The objective of the paper is to focus on the real transmission channels of financial shocks. More 
precisely, it analyses how monetary restrictions, in particular a credit crunch initiating in a particular 
country and disrupting selected productive activities, can affect worldwide production processes and 
lead to self-sustained debt deflation. To do so, the paper develops a stock-flow approach of the short 
term sectoral dynamics, that builds on two concepts which have a long tradition that can be traced to the 
Physiocrats of the XVIIIth Century: the "Tableau Économique", or supply-use analysis, and the 
monetary circuit.  
 
By combining the two concepts of international I-O analysis and monetary circuit, the paper will 
describe and model the sequence of financial and productive interactions along the international value 
chain. Because firms rely on suppliers in carrying out part of the production process (out-sourcing or 
off-shoring), and/or because they sell their production to other firms, the smooth realisation of 
production plans from initial investment to final sales depends on the availability of credit at all stages 
of the production chain. An initial exogenous monetary shock, for example when a bank shuts down an 
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existing line of credit will, therefore, replicate through the productive chain. Through this "real 
transmission channel", the initial financial shock will propagate itself along the productive chain, 
affecting all firms in the supply-chain network.  Modelling how these supply-driven impulses propagate 
through open economies and feed-back into the monetary circuit are the main objectives of the paper. 
An application is made on the USA-Asian case, using international I-O matrices developed for China, 
Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and the USA. A section of conclusions presents the main findings and the 
shortcomings of the proposed methodology.  
 
  
II. THE CONCEPTUAL BUILDING BLOCKS: MONETARY CIRCUIT, 
INPUT-OUTPUT AND CREDIT TRANSITION 
1) INTER-INDUSTRY VALUE CHAIN AND THE MONETARY CIRCUIT.  
The methodology used in this essay builds on two concepts introduced by the Physiocrats – supply-use 
matrix and monetary circuit – to jointly model the interactions between “real” and “monetary” 
processes in an open economy. Physiocrats viewed money solely as a medium of exchange, a mere 
“signe représentatif” (token money) while the alternative approach favoured by Mercantilists 
considered money as exogenous, an asset (gold) available in fixed quantities. In the “entrepreneur” 
economy described by the Physiocrats, credits make deposits and money is a means, not an end. 2 
Money circulates in the economy as a counterpart of the exchange of goods and services. The monetary 
counterpart of production begins with credit granted by the banks to the producers, and it ends when the 
goods that were produced are sold and the initial loan is reimbursed (money is "destroyed" at the end of 
the circuit).  
 
After several years of relative neglect during the 1980s when the focus of macroeconomics was the 
control of inflation (exogenous money was central to monetarist policies), the contagion of financial 
crisis in the late 1990s and the present situation of financial crisis and debt deflation call for new 
responses. It is certainly not a coincidence if endogenous money is making a "come back" in the recent 
macro-economic literature, like the New Institutional Economics (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003) and 
the Post Keynesians (Godley and Lavoie, 2007).  
 
From the practitioner's perspective which guides this essay, the monetary circuit and its close links to 
production are attractive features when analysing the actual functioning of a credit economy. Indeed, 
the concept of endogenous money is at the core of financial regulations such as minimum reserve 
requirements, which aim at controlling the capacity of banks to extend new loans. 3
 
The basic concepts behind the monetary circuit are simple and closely match the economy's production 
process. This process is divided into a finite number of stages, so that the output of one stage constitutes 
the input of the next —with the final stage yielding consumable output. All firms depend on credit to 
finance the current production costs (wages, intermediate consumption and use of capital goods). The 
monetary model starts with a request for credit by a productive firm to a bank in order to start a 
production process, and ends when the loan is reimbursed. The "temps du circuit", the elapsed time 
between money creation and its destruction, is closely related with the production time.  
  
Since the intermediate goods produced are not commodities, but are specific to the client's need, it is not 
easy —and it is certainly costly— to shift to another supplier. As a corollary, the failure of any single 
                                                     
2 The concept of the circuit was used by the Physiocrats in their arguments against the Mercantilists on the choice 
between real wealth and pecuniary wealth (Bloomfield, 1938).  It was also at the centre of the controversy 
between the Banking School, partisan of the endogenous or circuit approach, and the Currency School 
(exogenous money) in England during the XIXth century. 
3 Reserves are designed to satisfy withdrawal demands and affect the potential of the banking system to extend 
new loans (the money multiplier is equal to the inverse of the reserve ratio). Higher reserve requirements 
reduce credit-money creation.  
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supplier will affect the entire productive chain in the short and medium term. At best, as a result of this 
supply shock, the client-firm will suffer an increase in costs of production when shifting to an 
alternative supplier; at worse, it will have to stop its production. In times of crisis, the firms with a 
greater market power (and financial capacities) will help their key suppliers in resolving their cash-flow 
problems, even when it means worsening their own cash-flow situation  (see Box 1 for a recent example 
on the automobile industry). 
Box 1: Financing suppliers in times of crisis: Automaker's aid.  
 
According to the Head of the European suppliers organization, CLEPA, it takes time to change one 
supplier for another. The changeover can take six months to a year, depending on how complicated the 
part is to produce and a customer has to protect the weaker supplier until a stronger one learns how to 
produce the inputs according to the automaker's requirements.  
Thus, many automakers have undertaken specific actions to help the suppliers they want to protect from 
the credit crunch. According to the reference article, here is a sample of actions taken by some leading 
automakers to protect their key suppliers during the credit crunch: 
 
- BMW:  Encourage stronger suppliers to take over weaker ones; Pay in advance for parts; Speed up 
payments; Temporarily pay higher price for parts 
- Ford: Give loans; Speed up payments 
- Daimler: Temporarily pay higher price for parts; Provide advice on how to cut cost; Provide advice on 
how to improve efficiency 
- Porsche: Help finance production tooling 
- PSA: Speed up payments; Pay in advance for parts; Buy raw materials for them; Help them find 
financing; Advise on possible alliances, mergers 
- Renault: Speed up payments 
- VW group: Form special team in purchase department to prevent suppliers collapsing. 
_________________________________________ 
Source: Automotive News Europe 
December 8, 2008. 
http://www.autonews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081208/ANE03/812079905/1179 
 
  
Because production and commercialisation take time and payments are not immediate, credit money is 
needed to start and oil the system.4  Thus, a higher level of production implies a higher level of lending. 
For reasons that will be developed later, a higher level of lending implies a higher probability of default 
over the full business cycle. To avoid too strong an exposure to risk, regulators force banks to respect a 
series of minimum liquidity and asset-liability ratios. In this scheme, banks play a pivotal role and a 
sudden change in their supply of credit over the business cycle will affect the entire productive chain. 
 
In a globalized productive network, the financial and productive establishments constituting this 
interlinked network need not be localised in the same country. As mentioned, the current centrifuge 
forces that characterise the geographical distribution of the productive activities mean that the 
individual links will be distributed among different countries, most probably at different levels of 
development, in order to capture the opportunities offered by the different relative costs of labour 
vis-à-vis the costs of capital. A corollary is that the participating economies may be at a different phase 
of their business cycle and that macro-economic risks also include an exposure to exchange rate 
fluctuation. In addition, the quality of the available information on the financial credentials of the 
                                                     
4 In a modern industrial system, firms cannot finance investment and production costs on their accumulated assets 
(initial capital plus retained earnings) and have to borrow the funds. Actually, national accounts present the 
productive sector with net borrowing requirements. In the real world, funding comes from loans rather than 
issuing bonds or equities. Due to imperfect and asymmetric information, the Modigliani-Miller theorem does 
not hold and when firms are denied bank credit, they usually do not wish, nor are able, to raise capital by 
issuing new equity (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003. p34).  
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overseas suppliers and clients is lower than in the case of other domestic counterparts. Thus firms 
incurring in import or export operations will need to request special lines of credit (or guarantees) from 
the banking sector or specialised financial institutions in order to realise their international operations.  
 
Considering that in average the time needed for production will be longer when international operations 
are involved, because of higher transaction costs (communication and transport, in particular), any 
productive network involving overseas operators will require more credit than a pure domestic one (see 
Table 1). Because business cycles and capital adequacy ratio may differ from country to country and 
will also fluctuate rather independently, the probability of facing credit rationing at any point of the 
productive chain is greatly increased.   
 
Table 1  Costs of exporting merchandises, 2007 or most recent survey period 
 
Grouping or Region Time for export    
(days) 
Cost to export    
(US$ per container)a
World (country average) 26.1 1,230 
East Asia & Pacific 24.5 885 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 29.3 1,393 
Latin America & Caribbean 22.2 1,108 
Middle East & North Africa 24.8 992 
OECD 9.8 905 
South Asia 32.5 1,180 
Sub-Saharan Africa 35.6 1,660 
Notes: a Cost is recorded as the fees levied on a 20-foot container, excluding tariffs or trade taxes.  
Source:  World Bank Doing Business Project 
 
Finally, the model relates mainly to the goods producing sector. Even if the services sector is also 
increasingly engaging into international operations and is spreading across different countries, the 
specificities of services (e.g., prevalence of wages in the cost structure, low technical coefficients and 
stock requirements, coincidence of production and consumption) imply that their credit requirement by 
unit of output is lower than in the more traditional manufacturing sector. But the international provision 
of transportation and business services is rising, and plays an increasing role in smoothing the operation 
of the production chain. Indirectly, the share of domestic services in the value added content of exports 
is also high in industrialized countries (Daudin et alii, 2006).  Thus any adverse shock affecting a key 
service provider may also affect the productive chain.   
  
 
i) The basic monetary circuit 
A canonical version of the monetary model starts with a request for credit by a firm to a bank in order to 
start a production process. In order to simplify the model, without modifying the reasoning, it will be 
assumed that all profits made by the firm are redistributed to owners, so that there is no retained 
earnings and that all the value added created in the production process goes back to households as 
wages or distributed profits. 5
 
The bank’s decision to grant the loan rests on (i) the macroeconomic perception of the systemic risk 
attached to the business cycle; (ii) a sectoral evaluation of the market prospects, (iii) a microeconomic 
component proper to its evaluation of the firm’s capacity to manage properly the project and reimburse 
its debt, and (iv) the status of its capital adequacy ratio, reflecting its previous loan activity (a stock 
variable) in relation to capital requirements set by the prudential or regulatory authorities.  
 
                                                     
5 In a complete model, value added is also used to pay taxes and finance reserves. The payment of interest to the 
banking sector is treated, under the system of national account (SNA2008) as intermediate consumption of 
services. 
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Using the borrowed money, the firm purchases inputs and pays workers to produce the merchandises. 
The goods produced are sold to consumers or to other firms (if the firm produces investment or 
intermediate goods). When the firm is paid, it uses the money resulting from the sale to repay its debt to 
the bank (plus interest rate), and its own suppliers if they had extended payment facilities. But we saw 
that at systemic level, the quasi-credit extended among productive establishment will eventually result 
in increasing the total amount of credit extended by the finance sector to the producers.  
 
The repayment of outstanding loans not only “destroys money”, but also allows the bank to extend new 
credit within the limit of the prudential loans/assets ratio. Since this is credit money, any money injected 
in the circuit is balanced by a debt obligation. The record of debt and its ratio with respect to the bank’s 
assets (gold in the Physiocrats’ perspective, or any asset considered as secure by the regulatory 
authorities in a contemporary context) is a key feature of our model. 6 As we will see, it acts as a bridge 
between flows and stocks, between real and monetary stocks, and between micro and macro effects.  
 
Because the price of the asset is also linked to the macroeconomic conjuncture (business cycle), the 
regulatory process is pro-cyclical: in phases of boom, asset prices go up, increasing the lending capacity 
of banks; when the business cycle is downward oriented, asset prices go down and banks have to cut on 
their credits in order to respect the prudential ratio. 7
 
In a dynamic perspective, the monetary circuit can be presented from a graphical and a tabular format as 
follows: 
Figure 1A schematic presentation of the monetary circuit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Arrows numbers correspond to the flows described in Table 2
                                                     
6 Keen (2007) presents a Monetary Accounting matrix with a similar distinction between assets and liabilities, 
albeit within a different framework.  
7 Under Basel II, banks determine the required capital of lending by applying the risk weight that correspond to the 
borrower's rating and then by multiplying the risk weight by the (usually 8%) minimum requirement of capital. 
Because risks and the market value of assets are strongly (and negatively) correlated, the position in the 
business cycle has a strong pro-cyclical effect on the banks’ propensity to extend new loans. In practice, 
however, there are ways of circumventing the regulations through, inter alia, off-balance-sheet operations. 
Tenants of the pure endogenous money theory doubt about the actual binding effect of these requirements, and 
consider that banks which are willing to extend credit can always do it. Others maintain that Basel II is 
probably pro-cyclical (Repullo and Suarez, 2008). Accounting practices are also pro-cyclical (fair-value 
accounting, provisioning for expected losses on loans, etc.). 
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 Table 2 Simple monetary circuit in a closed economy 
Flow of Funds Time Capital 
Adequacy Ratio Bank Account Firm Account Households 
0. Initial situation A 0 0 0 
1. Credit A/αL 0 L 0 
2. Production A/αL 0 L-W W 
3. First round of sales A/αL 0 L-W+Q1 W-Q1
4. Firm pays interest 
and distributes profit   
A/αL rL L+Q1-W-rL-pQ W-Q1+pQ 
5. Bank pays employees 
and distributes profits  
A/αL 0 L+Q1-W-rL-pQ W-Q1+pQ+rL 
6. Second round of sales A/αL 0 L+Q-W-rL-pQ  W-Q+pQ+rL  
7. Firm repays loan A  0 Q-W-rL-pQ  W-Q+pQ+rL  
 
Notes:   A: initial assets of the bank,  
 L: Loan from the bank to the firm to finance the production costs, 
 α: risk weight attached to the loan (credit rating)  
 W: wages needed to produce Q, 
Q: value of merchandises produced by the project; Q1 is the value sold during the first round 
(corresponding to wages paid by firms), Q2 is the amount that is sold later after profits are distributed and 
employees from the financial sector are paid. There is no savings, all profits are distributed and Q=Q1+Q2
 r: interest rate 
 p: rate of profit after wages and operating costs 
 
The first column is simply a book entry that tracks the net asset situation of the banking system, because 
the bank does not actually loan money out of its capital. Each loan weighs on the adequacy ratio 
according to the risk attached to the loan. In turn, this risk, while specific to each firm (its own financial 
situation and that of its clients and key suppliers), depends also on the macroeconomic situation and the 
particular sensitiveness of the sector to downturns. 
 
Credit money is created ex nihilo when a loan is granted to the firm and its account is credited with a 
sum (L) that the firm will be able to use in order to pay for the goods and services it needs. The system 
is sustainable as long as (i) the production plan pays its costs and remunerates the stakeholders (salaries 
and distributed profits), i.e (Q-W-rL-pQ) is positive or nil, and (ii) the banking system does not exceed 
its adequacy ratio. 
 
Because all profit is distributed to households and all income is consumed, the last position (No. 7) is 
equivalent to the initial one (0), closing the circuit from a dynamic perspective. All credit money has 
been destroyed when the loan is repaid in full, and net flows sum up to zero. For money to be destroyed, 
all real transactions should take place as planned, i.e. there is no unsold final or intermediary goods. 
This characteristic of the monetary circuit provides an insight on an important property of the system: 
any stock of goods remaining in the "real" system (and reported as investment in national accounts) has 
a counterpart in outstanding credit money in the financial circuit.  
 
Outstanding stocks can be voluntary, or "desired", when firms wish to smooth production and sales (i.e., 
to protect themselves from disruption in their production chain, or to be able to face a surge in demand). 
But stocks can be undesired when they correspond to major negative shocks or when production plans 
based on ex-ante previsions prove to be too optimistic when confronted with the ex-post situation. Any 
accumulation of stocks, either desired or undesired, must be financed out of retained profits or bank 
credit. In practice, because firms have a structural saving gap, any increase in their stocks (assimilated 
to gross investment in national accounts) will increase their net demand for credit.  
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ii) The open monetary circuit 
The previous part has introduced a very simple model, which grossly underestimates the complexity of 
the actual circuit. 8 In reality, a multiplicity of simultaneous production plans are in place and the 
closure of the system (the sale of the production) does not depend on the wages and profits distributed 
by the producer, but on a stream of activities going on in the rest of the economy. In the same way, firms 
are not homogeneous: some produce final goods, others investment or intermediate goods. As seen 
before, even within the same sector of activity, the productive process can be fragmented among 
various establishments. Indeed, banks themselves pay wages and distribute profits, consume goods and 
services produced by other firms or pay an interest rate on time deposits from household and firms. 
Therefore the productive and monetary circuit are longer, and the elapsed time between initial and final 
positions (the "temps du circuit") is increased. The longer the circuit, the larger the number of individual 
firms participating in the supply chain, the higher the probability of outstanding credit money.  
 
When the economy is open, domestic production competes with imports, but it can also be exported. 
Additionally, domestic production of final goods may include imported intermediate inputs. This 
increases the complexity of the process, and the length of the circuit. As complexity increases, so does 
the probability of facing problems.  
 
Disregarding any differences in exchange and interest rates, a very simplified circuit involving two 
firms and two countries (a firm in home country producing a final good, and its supplier located in a 
foreign country) would look as in Table 3. 
 
When the system is open to the rest of the world, a series of complications arises. Part of the purchasing 
power created during the production process is distributed in the foreign country while the final goods 
are sold in the home country. If Q is not exported to the rest of the world and purchased by foreign 
households, then  the quantity produced will be greater than the quantity sold (Q > Q1+Q2 ) even if there 
are no savings in the home country and all profits are distributed.  Unless these final goods are exported 
and sold to the foreign households, undesired stocks of finished products (Q – [Q1+Q2]) will accumulate 
in the home country, associated to outstanding credit, while foreign households will accumulate savings 
for the amount of wages and profits created when processing the intermediate goods (Ww+rLw). 
Differently from the previous case (closed economy), the situation described by the final row is not 
identical to the initial one. In terms of national accounts, this appears as a trade deficit in the balance of 
payments of the home country (and a surplus for the rest of the world). 9
 
The funds borrowed to finance production are used to purchase intermediate goods and services from 
other firms that may be located in different countries. In the same way, the production process depends 
on the capacity of the respective supplier firms to obtain credit from their own banks and deliver in time 
                                                     
8 Godley and Lavoie (2007) offer a complete and detailed presentation of a complete stock-flow representation of 
the circuit. Albeit their approach is clearly build from a Post-Keynesian perspective regarding the capacity of 
banks to modulate their supply of credit, their description can be adapted to many other non-Walrasian 
theoretical settings, such as the loanable funds theory that competed with Keynesian theory since the 1930s or 
the Austrian school. Indeed, it is the flexibility of the monetary circuit in adapting to a number of theoretical 
settings that makes it very attractive from the practitioner's perspective. 
9 Opening the monetary circuit to cover balance of payments operations involve a series of complex interactions 
that are not treated in this very simple model. See Godley and Lavoie (2007) for an example. 
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Table 3 Simple monetary circuit in an open economy 
 
 Home Country Rest of the World 
Time index Capital 
Adequacy Ratio 
Bank Account Firm Account Households Bank Capital 
Adequacy 
Bank 
Account 
Firm Account Households 
0. Initial situation Ad 0 0 0 Aw 0 0 0 
1. Credit production in 
home country 
Ad/αd. Ld 0 Ld 0 Aw 0 0 0 
2. Credit intermediate 
inputs in RofW 
Ad/αd(Ld) 0 Ld  0 Aw/αw.Lw 0 Lw 0 
3. Production 
intermediate inputs M 
Ad/αd(Ld) 0 Ld  0 Aw/αw.Lw 0 Lw–Ww Ww
4. Import of inputs and 
production of Q 
Ad/αd(Ld) 0 Ld - Wd -M Wd Aw/αw.Lw 0 Lw+ M –Ww Ww
5. First round: sales of Q1 Ad/αd(Ld) 0 Ld +Q1- Wd -M  Wd –Q1 Aw/αw.Lw 0 Lw+ M –Ww Ww
6. Firms pay interest and 
distribute profit   
Ad/αd(Ld) rLd Ld+Q1- rLd - Wd –M–pQ Wd +pQ–Q1 Aw/αw.Lw rLw Lw+M–rLw–Ww- pM Ww+pM 
7. Banks pay employees 
and distribute profits  
Ad/αd(Ld) 0 Ld+Q1– Wd – rLd –M–pQ Wd +pQ+ rLd –Q1 Aw/αw.Lw 0 Liw+M–rLw–Ww- pM Ww+pM+ rLw
8. Second round of sales 
(Q2) 
Ad/αd(Ld) 0 Lfd+Q– Wd – rLd –M–pQ Wd +pQ+ rLd –Q Aw/αw.Lw 0 Lw+M–rLw–Ww– pM Ww+pM+ rLw
9. Firms reimburse loans Ad 0 Q1 Wd – rLd –M –pQ  Wd +pQ+ rLd –Q Aw 0 M–rLw–Ww– pM Ww+pM+ rLw
Notes: Same notations as Table 2 before, except: 
α: risk adjusted weights  
Subscripts:  
d: domestic; w: rest of the world. 
M: intermediate goods produced in the rest of the world. 
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their intermediate inputs. 
 
Because of the complexity and intricateness of the simultaneous production plans existing at any 
moment in an economy, there is always a large amount of outstanding credit money. Since this 
outstanding credit money has a counterpart in the capital adequacy ratio of banks, a limit may be 
reached (either because "too much" credit has already been extended –in relation to bank's assets– or 
because the underlying quality of the borrowing firms has deteriorated), constraining the supply of new 
loans and the renewal of existing lines of credit. In their most severe forms, the binding constraints may 
cause a "credit crunch". 
 
The procyclical nature of prudential ratios is a central feature of the model, and the object of much 
debate. In many reports on the implications of minimum capital-requirements, the potential restrictions 
are often qualified by mentioning that most banks hold capital in excess of the regulatory minima or are 
able to circumvent the binding constraints. According to Repullo and Suarez (2008), this "benign 
neglect" of the potential procyclical effect is due to a series of misconceptions. Indeed, the global crisis 
of 2008/2009 showed that larger than expected market swings, with deteriorating balance-sheet quality, 
limit severely the access to equity and financial markets. As mentioned by Krugman (2008), in time of 
crisis, the core problem is capital rather than liquidity. 
 
Since international transactions are more complex and riskier than domestic ones (because of the 
exchange rate risks), they may weigh more in the Capital Adequacy Ratio of banks, and will require 
additional guaranties such as separate trade credit or insurance to cover the transaction with the foreign 
country. It is also well known that international transactions may add very significant costs to the chain 
of supply (tariffs, but also administrative and waiting time, shipping, freight and insurance, etc.).  
The additional cost can be very high when the supplier is located in a developing country, as seen 
previously in Table 1. As a consequence, trade-related loans (e.g, import and export credits), especially 
for transactions with developing countries, are particularly affected by credit crunch. The probability of 
an exogenous credit shock on these transactions (loan Lw in Table 3) is therefore higher in times of 
crisis. 10
 
iii) Incorporating credit rating in the monetary circuit  
The rating of a firm can take several values, for example from AAA to CCC and Default. Banks extend 
credit according to these ratings and to the situation of their prudential ratios. When a firm is 
downgraded, it affects its capacity to obtain new credit, reducing the creation of credit money in the 
circuit. But rating migration affects also the systemic variable represented by the capital adequacy 
constraint. The riskier the loan (Li), the heavier its weight (αi) on the prudential ratio [A/Σ(αi Li)]. For 
example, the weight is 0.2 for loans to firms rated AAA to AA, 0.5 from A+ to A-, 1.0 from BBB+ to 
BB-.  
 
By deteriorating both the ratings of firms and the quality of the loan portfolio detained by the banks, 
supply shocks equally affect financial stocks and flows. Real shocks affecting the production chain will 
initially change the ratings of all the firms belonging to the network, reducing the probability of having 
their loan requests accepted, or their existing loans renewed. In addition, the downgrading of some of 
the existing loans will reduce the profitability of the bank, because it must increase its asset holdings 
and provision for losses. It may eventually upset the overall capacity of banks to extend new credit, 
irrespective of the individual credit rating of the requesting firms, when banks are operating close to 
their "credit capacity" as it must be expected under normal conditions of profit maximization. This will 
in turn reverberate into an additional credit shock, and so on and so forth. An initial exogenous 
monetary shock (e.g., when a bank unexpectedly shuts down an existing line of credit) will, therefore, 
replicate endogenously through the productive chain. 
 
                                                     
10 The Institute for International Finance was forecasting a 50% reduction in capital flows to emerging markets in 
2009. 
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This dynamic is also embedded in the methodology used by rating agencies. The credit rating of 
individual firms and their migration to higher or lower status are based on a combination of (i) 
micro-economic considerations, directly related to the financial situation of the firm and the quality of 
its management; (ii) sectoral specificities, such as the cyclical nature of the business in which the firm 
operates; and (iii) macro-economic considerations, such as the probability of expansion or recession.  
 
Because these components are not independent, there is a resonance phenomenon. Small micro-shocks 
reverberate through the macro-waves and amplify them. When the business cycle is upward oriented, 
the price of assets is increasing, improving the prudential ratio [A/Σ(αi Li)], while firms and banks have 
a lower rate of underperforming clients. Thus both micro and macro components lower the perception 
of risk affecting firms (independently of their individual situation). This state of affairs pushes the 
banks to extend further loans, creating a positive environment (Krugman, 2008).  
 
On the contrary, when the business cycle is downward oriented, asset prices detained by banks (when 
priced to market) tend to decrease and the perception of risks increases, resulting in a downward 
migration of credit rating. As a consequence, banks are increasingly adverse to risk, and less likely to 
extend credit for similar projects. The resulting effect on the credit rating of these micro-decisions can 
lead to a credit crunch and even to a recession.  
 
 
2) PRODUCTIVE CHAINS, NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND INTERNATIONAL INPUT-OUTPUT MATRIX 
 
On the supply side, firms produce intermediate goods and final goods that are sold domestically or 
exported; on the demand side they use intermediate inputs (either domestic or imported) including 
financial and non-financial services and generate value added which is used to compensate employees, 
pay taxes and generate (distributed and retained) profits. In actual terms, production involves a 
continuum of individual projects that are closely interrelated and take place in different countries.  
 
The System of National Accounts allows us to describe and model these supply-demand interrelations. 
As seen earlier, the interdependence is not only real, but also financial and the flows of goods and 
services captured by the productive accounts have their counterpart in the monetary circuit.  
 
i) The basic circuit of goods and services 
 
In a simple two-sector economy, the real flows of goods and services (including factorial services, i.e, 
labour and capital) are as follows: 
 
Table 4 Flows of goods and services in a simple two-sector economy 
 
Sectors Intermediate 
demand 1 
Intermediate 
demand 2 
Final demand Exports Total output 
Sector 1 Q11 Q12 F1 X1 Q1
Sector 2 Q21 Q22 F2 X2 Q2
Imports M1 M2 Mf   
Value Added VA1 VA2    
Total inputs Q1 Q2    
Notes: Qij: intermediate consumption of products from sector i by j;   Fi: final demand for products produced by i 
= 1,2 or imported from rest of the world ("RoW");  Xi: exports of i to "RoW" 
Mi: imports of intermediate goods used by i from "RoW"; Qi: total production of i 
VAi: value added (factorial services, corresponding to wages and profits) 
 
The horizontal lines show the use of goods and services to supply other firms, final consumers and rest 
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of the world (exports). The vertical columns describe the requirements by sector j: purchases from 
domestic and rest of the world suppliers needed to produce the goods, remuneration of factors of 
productions (capital and labour, equal to the generation of value added). Following the 
recommendations of the SNA2008, the payment of financial services is considered as an intermediate 
consumption. 
 
Inter-sectoral relationships are represented by the coefficients Qij. The technical coefficients 
conforming the input-output matrix (I-O) are derived by normalizing the intermediate coefficients Qij  
by the value of total production (aij= Qij/Qi). These I-O coefficients present the direct requirements of 
inputs from "i" for producing one unit of output of industry "j". For example, to produce one unit of 
output, sector 2 will require a12 units from sector 1.  
 
The technical coefficients tell only part of the story of the productive chain. In order to be able to 
produce the a12 units demanded by sector 2, the productive sector 1 will need inputs from sector 2 
(a21.a12 units). To satisfy the demand created by one additional unit of output in sector 2, individual 
firms in each sector 1 and 2 will also require inputs produced by suppliers operating from the same 
sector (a22 and a22.a12). And so on, as the indirect demands generated at every step create in turn 
additional requirements.  
 
It can be shown that the feed-back sequence resulting from the initial demand injection can be obtained 
by the series I + A +A2+A3+ … +An 
 
Where:  
I is an identity matrix representing the initial demand injection and A is the input-output matrix.  
An  is the progressive impact of initial demands at the nth stage of the production chain.  
 
When n tends towards infinity, the series has a limit (known as Leontief Inverse Matrix) L=(I-A)-1 
The coefficients lij of the Leontief Inverse measure the depth (intensity) of the backward linkages 
between sectors. They describe entirely the direct and indirect flows of intermediate products involved 
by the productive chains.  
 
 
ii) The open circuit of goods and services 
In an open economy where firms are vertically integrated, firms can import their intermediate inputs 
from external suppliers or sell goods for processing to other non-resident industries. International I-O 
matrices extend the description of inter-sectoral linkages by disaggregating imports and exports 
between intermediate and final goods, identifying for intermediate goods their countries and sectors of 
origin/destination. 
 
A two-country two-sector model would look like Table 5. 
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 Table 5 Flows of goods and services in a two-country two-sector model. 
Sectors/country Country a 
Intermediate 
demand 1 
Country a 
Intermediate 
demand 2 
Country b 
Intermediate 
demand 1 
Country b 
Intermediate 
demand 2 
Final 
demand 
(a+b) 
Exports 
to Rest 
of the 
World 
Total 
output 
Country a 
Sector 1 
Qaa11 Qaa12 Qab11 Qab12 Fa1 Xa1 Qa1
Country a 
Sector 2 
Qaa21 Qaa22 Qab21 Qab22 Fa2 Xa2 Qa2
Country b 
Sector 1 
Qba11 Qba12 Qbb11 Qbb12 Fb1 Xb1 Qb1
Country b 
Sector 2 
Qba21 Qba22 Qbb21 Qbb22 Fb2 Xb2 Qb2
Imports from 
R. of World 
Ma1 Ma2 Mb1 Mb2 Mf   
Value Added VAa1 VAa2 VAb1 VAb2    
Total inputs Qa1 Qa2 Qb1 Qb2    
Notes: See Table 4
 
These international I-O matrices can be used to measure vertical integration of production processes. 
For example, Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) proposes a VS index based on the imported content of 
exports (VS= M.L.X). When based on the Leontief-Inverse, these measures imply that all linkages take 
place in the same time (or that all the transactions take place within the unit of time chosen to measure 
M and X, usually a year). Inomata (2008) corrects for this short-coming and derives from international 
I-O tables a new measurement for international fragmentation of the production process that takes also 
into consideration the depth of vertical integration (the average propagation length of inter-industry 
linkages). 
 
International I-O matrices such as the ones described in Table 5 provide a complete picture of the 
intensity of both macro-economic and inter-industry linkages across borders that sustain the open 
monetary circuit presented in Table 3. While business circles affect cross-border activity through 
changes in final demand (domestic and exports), the modelling of inter-sectoral linkage through I-O 
matrices allows to complete the picture and simulate the propagation of shocks in demand through the 
vertical integration of production processes.   
 
 
iii) Measuring the transmitted impact  
The international I-O matrices allow to model the real transmission channels of a financial shock 
occurring at any stage of the value chain, when this shock breaks the inter-industry linkages that 
translate final consumption into a network of intermediate demands. Leontief models are 
demand-driven and simulate the transmission of demand shocks through backward linkages; to 
simulate supply-driven shocks through forward linkages, I-O matrices have to be adapted into what is 
known as "Ghosh" matrix (see Box 2) 
 
The "real channel impact" from country “a” to country “b” will therefore be proportional to (i) the final 
demand of exported consumer goods and services to "a", and (ii) the sum of Ghosh-Inverse coefficients 
linking industries from both countries. The second part, which measures the real impact through the 
supply chain, is larger than a simple measure based on the value of imported intermediate goods from 
"a", because the Ghosh-Inverse considers both direct and indirect impacts.  
 
Ignoring final demand effects (the usual "Leontief approach" based on backward linkages), the intensity 
of inter-country transmission of financial shocks following a credit crunch affecting the productive 
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sectors will differ according to the degree of vertical integration, as measured by the strength and depth 
of forward industrial linkages. Ignoring also quantitative disruption effects that would prevail when no 
substitution among inputs is possible, the imported real supply-driven impact coefficient (IRSIC) is 
proportional to the imported content of domestic production.  
IRSIC = %ΔP/P =ΔQ.(I-B)-1 ● 1/Q         [ 1]  
Q: line vector of initial sectoral output 
ΔQ: line vector of supply shocks 
ΔP/P : vector of price shocks in percentage 
(I-B)-1: Ghosh matrix 
● : Hadomard product 11
 
It should be clear that, because of the inherent limitations of the Ghosh matrices, only one type of 
supply-driven shocks will be captured at macroeconomic level: shocks which are translated into an 
increase in production prices. The model simulates only non-disruptive supply shocks initiating from 
the default of a supplier; client firms are always able to find a substitute supplier instantly, but at a 
higher cost. The price shock hypothesis is obviously well-suited for segmented markets, with 
monopolistic characteristics, but is also compatible with standard neoclassical hypotheses, as long as 
marginal costs are increasing in the short term.  
 
The additional production cost is related to the elasticity of technical substitution in production, 
including elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported inputs (Armington elasticity). 12 
When Armington elasticities are low, large price changes are required to accommodate small changes 
in quantities. This is typically the case when manufactured intermediate inputs are differentiated and 
client-specific, at the difference of commodities like oil and minerals.  Substitution is difficult and takes 
time in the long run; in the short-run framework of this essay, it takes money. 
 
The Ghosh multipliers simulate the transmission of the higher production costs caused by the initial 
shock through the entire supply chain. By factoring-in the direct and indirect cost effects, it provides the 
analyst with an adequate "tracking methodology". 
 
Dealing only with price effects may be seen as a limitation. Severe shocks that translate into critical 
disruption of the supply chain, creating bottlenecks and a decline in the volume of production, are 
excluded. Even a moderate negative supply shock, but close enough to the initial demand impulse (final 
demand), may impede the normal implementation of the initial production project if the producer 
cannot easily redeploy their demand for intermediate goods to other suppliers. 13  
 
Nevertheless, in open economies with large numbers of suppliers, systemic disruptive shocks are not 
common, except perhaps when the supply restriction affects strategic commodities like oil. In addition, 
it should be noted that the distance of the supply-shock to the final demand is taken into account, 
because the Ghosh matrix ponders the suite of technical coefficients according to the proximity of each 
round to the initial demand. The closer the shock, the larger the impact. 14 It is even possible to model 
secondary demand-driven shocks using a similar approach (see Annex II).  
 
                                                     
11 This entrywise product (a1.b1, a2.b2, ..., an.bn) is similar to a Kronecker product on two matrices or vectors of same 
dimensions. 
12  While Input-Output models suppose perfect inter-sectoral complementarities of inputs (zero technical 
substitution), they do not restrain intra-sectoral substitution between domestic and foreign inputs. The estimate 
of these elasticities, in particular through the Armington specification, plays a central role in the flourishing 
CGE literature. 
13 It takes at least a year to redeploy the production of critical parts in the automotive industry, according to 
Automotive News Europe (see Box 1 again). 
14 Because technical coefficients are normalized and less than unity, An  (the impact of initial demands at the nth 
stage of the production chain) rapidly tends to 0 when n increases. 
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Box 2. Demand-Driven and Supply-Driven Input-Output Models 
 
The well-known "demand-driven" model was developed by Wassily Leontief in the 1930s; two decades 
later, Ambica Ghosh adapted the I-O model to analyse supply shocks. I-O models assume that all inputs 
are complementary (the production function is such that inputs should be used in a fixed proportion, 
with no substitution at least in the short time), and the demand impulses are transmitted primarily 
through backward linkages. When the final demand for a product "q" is altered exogenously, the 
primary impact is felt on the demand for those sectoral outputs and commodities that are used as inputs 
for the production of the product "q". The backward linkages trigger a series of secondary demand 
effects that progressively die down and are captured by the Leontief-inverse matrix (I-A)-1.  
 
The Ghosh approach states that each intermediate output is sold to a series of productive sectors in fixed 
proportions. When the production of an intermediate product "q" is exogenously altered, the primary 
effect is felt by those sectors that need "q" as input. This will trigger forward effects, either direct (to the 
sectors requiring "q" as input for their production) or secondary (sectors depending on intermediate 
goods that had required "q" as input). As in the Leontief case, the iterative process dies down to reach 
another equilibrium.  
 
The accumulation of impacts can be measured by the Ghosh inverse  (I-B)-1. As in the Leontief case, the 
matrix B is build using the inter-sectoral transaction matrix Qij, but the allocation coefficients are 
normalized in line (destination of output) by the value of production, and not in column as for technical 
coefficients (origin of productive factors used in the production). 
 
The Leontief logic for backward linkage is based on standard economics: sectors do respond to changes 
in demand, they increase their production when demand is higher and reduce it when demand is lower. 
The Ghoshian approach is much weaker, and its theoretical aspects are somewhat contentious. In 
absence of a change in effective demand, pushing-up production through additional supply of inputs 
would have the same effect as pushing on a string. Indeed, the theoretical reservations about the Ghosh 
model led to its relative demise as a macroeconomic modelling tool in the quantity space.  
 
Nevertheless, the Ghosh approach is still useful in the price space, considering that it can be used to 
model the transmission of shocks to the costs of production (Mesnard, 2007). It is particularly true for 
short-term analysis, when firms have limited capacity for substituting the disrupted input by shifting to 
alternative and more expensive suppliers.  The mechanism is as follows: a quantity restriction on any 
single intermediate good forces the client-firm to shift to other suppliers (foreign or domestic). While 
this is always possible in our model, it has a cost, as alternative suppliers will supply the needed 
quantities at a higher price. 
 
The final impact on production costs depends on a conjunction of quantitative and qualitative factors. 
The quantitative factor is proportional to the contribution of the disrupted input in the production 
function and is captured by the allocation coefficients of the I-O matrix. The qualitative factor is 
microeconomic in nature, and is determined by the particular market structure for this product, in 
particular by the possibility of substitution. The supply elasticity is usually determined by the time 
frame allowed for substitution, by the spare production capacity available to alternative suppliers and 
their level of stocks, and by their technical capabilities (including the ownership of critical patents).  
The stronger the constraint (for example when the initial supplier had a de facto monopoly), the higher 
the potential rise in production cost. At the limit, when no substitution exists, then all the adjustments 
along the supply chain have to be done in the quantity space, proportionally to the bottleneck.   
 
The elasticity of substitution between similar inputs, from various countries of origin are known as  
Armington elasticities. Estimating these elasticities has generated an abundant literature, especially in 
areas linked with international trade literature and computable general-equilibrium models, A review of 
existing results show that the elasticities (estimated using multilateral trade data) for the intermediate 
inputs industries tend to be higher than those for the final consumption goods industries (Saito, 2004). 
 
In practice, one should expect a mixture of price and quantity effects, as demand for higher priced 
products —intermediate input or the resulting final good— will go down.  The modelling of the sectoral 
reactions to changes in relative input prices and the related structural interactions would ideally have to 
be realized using computable general-equilibrium models. 
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3) CREDIT CONTAGION AND THE FEED BACK FROM REAL TO FINANCIAL CHANNELS. 
 
The previous two sections presented, from a monetary perspective and a supply-chain perspective, the 
linkages that exist within and between globalized industrial systems. The following section will 
formalise the connections between both financial and real circuits, through the modelling of the "α" 
parameter in the Capital Adequacy Ratio that appears originally as a simple accounting device in the 
monetary circuit (see Table 2 and Table 3).   This institutional ratio constrains the total amount of credit 
that a bank may issue. As mentioned, international standards, issued by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), set a 8% threshold for total risk-weighted assets. 
  
i) Banks' assessment of business risks: Unifying the two circuits 
We saw that the monetary circuit starts with a request for credit by a firm to a bank in order to finance a 
production process. The bank decisions of granting the loan is based on a mix of (i) macroeconomic 
perception, (ii) the sector of activity of the firm, (iii) a microeconomic component proper to the firm and 
(iv) the institutional capacity of the bank to extend new credit within the limit of its ratio loans/assets. 
These components are not independent; as we shall see, they are closely interrelated.  
 
The microeconomic component of the bank's decision-making process is based, inter alia, on the direct 
business connections of the firm requesting a loan. In a vertically integrated production chain, the 
default of a client can cause distress to its suppliers, and the difficulties of a key supplier can jeopardise 
the viability of a production plan. Some industrial sectors (like construction or automobiles) are more 
"pro-cyclical" than others. According to the strength of its backward and forward linkage, the credit 
worthiness of a pro-cyclical firm will reflect, through the microeconomic channel, on its direct clients 
and suppliers, even when they do not operate in the same sector. 
 
Also, because risks and the market value of assets are strongly (and negatively) related, the position in 
the business cycle has a greatly inflated pro-cyclical effect on the banks’ propensity to extend new 
loans. Indeed, when a downward phase develops into a recession, the price of assets may drop below a 
critical value, forcing banks to stop any new credit activity, cancelling existing credit arrangements to 
reduce risk exposure irrespective of the merit of investment projects and firms credit worthiness. This 
situation defines what is called a "credit crunch". Obviously, when a firm's request for credit is turned 
down and it must scale down production, it affects in turn its suppliers and even its clients through the 
supply chain, and affects final demand through lower household income (wages and profits).  
 
For the most vulnerable sectors, that are both cyclical and vertically integrated, the conjunction of two 
waves of shocks, supply and demand driven, can lead to a resonance effect. The total effect of the shock 
is then a multiple of each component taken in isolation. Second, according to the monetary circuit 
described in Table 3, the shock will affect both flows variables (additional demand for credit money to 
cope with the shock) and stock or state variables (the credit rating of individual firms requesting 
additional loans, and the capital adequacy ratio of the banks extending loans).  Thus, in a recessive 
cycle, the conjunction of real supply and demand shock, on the one hand, and of stock-flow financial 
shocks, on the other hand, may have large systemic effects, even when the initial shocks are rather 
limited in scope. 
 
Thus, even if initially a financial shock is exogenous, its effects on the industrial chain will cause this 
shock to reverberate through the real circuit, affecting in turn the monetary circuit through the default 
risks, as perceived by the financial sector. The size of the multiplier effect depends on the initial balance 
sheets of the financial intermediaries. Actually, modelling the weights "αi" (the financial rating of 
productive sectors) in the Capital Adequacy Ratio (A/ΣLiαi) synthesizes most of the real-monetary 
dynamics embedded in the present approach, including stock-flow interactions: 
 
-  From a "flow" perspective, the "αi" are the result of a credit rating process that considers both 
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financial and productive aspects, associated with (i) the firm itself and its management (what we called 
the microeconomic dimension), (ii) its mode of insertion in the productive economy and the related 
risks of supply-driven shocks transmitted through the supply-chain and (iii) its exposure to the 
macroeconomic business cycle, as captured by the demand-driven shocks. 
-  From a "stock" perspective, the real shocks translate into the accumulation of undesired stocks 
and extend the life expectancy of credit money, with the related accumulation of liquidity, because 
loans are not reimbursed in full. 15  Not only money is not destroyed as expected, but on the financial 
side, the accumulation of bad debts deteriorates the banks' balance sheet (loss provisions) and its 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (A/ΣLiαi). 
 
The "stock" effect on the Capital Adequacy Ratio is not limited to the domestic sector. In a globalized 
economy such as described in our model, the national financial sectors are also closely integrated and 
all economies now share "leveraged common creditors". In such a context, balance sheet contagion 
become pervasive (Krugman, 2008). 
 
4) A REDUCED-FORM INDICATOR OF CONTAGION  
The previous sections identified the three conceptual building blocks used to define contagion of 
financial shocks through the productive chain: monetary circuit, international input-output matrices and 
credit transition. Those three components show a high degree of cross-causality, as we saw. Because 
our main objective is not to build a complete stock-flow model but to simulate the contagion of a shock 
initiating in the monetary sphere, a simplifying option is chosen. It starts from an hypothetical steady 
state in which all stocks and all flows are held constant, and explores what would happen if the credit 
required by a production programme is not granted for an exogenous reason (such as a "credit crunch", 
typical of the 2008/2009 international conjuncture).  
 
The chain of causalities is as follows:  
 
(a) The shock initiates in the monetary circuit (e.g., an existing line of credit is unexpectedly shut 
down), and it affects the production plans of a firm that is inserted at some point in a larger productive 
chain; because both its clients and suppliers cannot shift to other producers immediately and at no cost, 
the discontinuity in the production flow will reverberate through higher costs across the system 
represented by the I-O matrix. The real shock, once it has fully reverberated through the entire supply 
chains, is proportional to the Ghosh coefficients that factor-in the sum of direct and indirect forward 
effects. 
 
(b) Exogenous supply shocks also affect demand because increases in production costs reflect into 
higher prices and lower demand. As previously mentioned, the resulting negative demand-driven 
secondary shocks can be modelled individually using traditional Leontief model (final demand 
impulses), or by capturing the backward (demand) sectoral effects of supply-driven multipliers 
(Papadas and Dahl, 1999). Annex 2 explores the relationship between the initial supply impulse and the 
secondary demand shocks.  
 
(c) The  real shock, then, feeds back into the monetary circuit through (i) the building-up of undesired 
stocks of finished and intermediate goods through the supply chain, leading to the accumulation of 
outstanding credit-money in the circuit;  and (ii) the contagion of financial risks affecting the rating of 
firms. Because the capacity of banks to create new money is limited by their capital adequacy ratio, the 
latter reduces in turn the capacity of banks to extend new credit, initiating a vicious circle. This 
obviously affects the most vulnerable firms (those more closely connected to the sector of activity 
affected by the initial shock), but has a systemic impact that reduces the banks' systemic capacity to 
extend new credit, regardless of the individual merits of the investment programmes. 16
                                                     
15 As mentioned, the core problem in the present 2008/2009 financial crisis is capital, not liquidity.  
16 When the adequacy ratio is reaching a critical limit, the banking sector turns down most requests and flight for 
safety by investing in good quality government bonds, especially US bonds. The flight for quality that 
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In conclusion, a reduced model of contagion through the supply chain only requires two variables to 
simulate and track the systemic implications of an exogenous financial shock: one variable of flow 
(IRSIC constructed on the real circuit, possibly augmented for secondary demand driven effects) and 
one of stock (Capital Adequacy Ratio) derived from the monetary circuit. Because the stock-variable is 
partially dependent on the flow-variable, the strategic variable to be measured in order to evaluate the 
risk of contagion is the imported real impact coefficient (IRSIC).  
 
 
III. APPLICATION TO THE US-ASIA COMPACT 
International I-O matrices are necessary to measure IRSIC. Building these tables from national I-O data 
is a painstaking exercise, requiring the harmonization of national formats and classifications, the 
inclusion additional information such as disaggregating imports into sectoral intermediates and final 
goods and, finally, the compilation of all national tables into a single I-O matrix. We build our case 
study on a series of interlinked economies, China, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and the USA, which are all 
key international and regional traders at different stages of industrial development and with strong 
specificities in terms of their insertion in the global economy. 
 
1) THE DATA 
We use a sub-set of the Asian I-O tables developed by the JETRO's Institute for Developing 
Economies. 17 The original Asian I-O tables are available for year 2000 in US$, and are disaggregated 
into 76 sectors of activity. 18 To facilitate data manipulation, the table was rearranged to include only 10 
sectors of particular interest for our purpose: Agriculture (IDE's sectors 001 to 007), Mining (008 to 
011), Textile, apparel and leather products (018 to 023), electronic products (049 to 054), transport 
equipment (055 to 058), other manufactures (012 to 017, 025 to 048, 059 and 060), basic services 
(electricity, gas and water: 061 and 062),  construction (063 and 064), trade and transport (065 and 066), 
and services (067 to 076). 
   
Inter-industrial flows based on year 2000 are nevertheless inadequate to analyze the present state of 
interdependence between those economies, considering in particular that China joined the WTO only in 
2001. Using the estimations produced by Pula and Peltonen (2009), we derive an input coefficient 
matrix from the 2000 table, by incorporating updated information on multilateral trade and national 
accounts aggregates in current US$ for 2006 (see annex 1).  
 
The content of imported inputs in sectoral output can be obtained for each country by adding, for each 
domestic sector, the imports from the other four partners in the international I-O matrix, plus the total 
imports from the rest of the world (Table 6). Because inputs purchased from another domestic sector 
also include imported goods, the best estimate is given by panel b of Table 6, which includes the direct 
and indirect imports 19. A first review of the data shows that sectors differ with respect to their openness 
and reliance on imports. Manufactures are more reliant on imported inputs, the maximum being reached 
by the electronic sector in which more than 60% of raw products and intermediate goods needed for 
sectoral production in Malaysia and Thailand are imported.    
                                                                                                                                                                     
followed the 2008 subprime crisis and the subsequent melting down of the international banking system 
illustrate this point and explain why the dollar appreciated despite the fact that the US economy was at the core 
of the crisis. 
17 See IDE-JETRO (2006) for details on the I-O coverage and the statistical treatments. 
18 IDE-Jetro, updating the Asian tables to year 2006. 
19 By multiplying the line vector of import-weights by the Leontief-Inverse, it is also possible to compute the 
imported content of final production, after factoring all inter-sectoral backward effects corresponding to the 
supply chain.  
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Table 6 Direct and indirect shares of imported inputs in sectoral production, 2006 
(percent) 
D
irect share of  
im
ported inputs  
in total output 
A
griculture 
M
ining 
Textile 
  Electronics 
Transport 
Equipm
ent 
O
ther 
M
anufactures 
Electricity 
W
ater G
as 
C
onstruction 
Trade 
Transport 
O
ther  
Services 
 a. Direct share of  imported inputs in sectoral output a
China 5.0 6.5 7.1 11.4 6.6 7.3 6.5 6.0 4.9 6.5 
Japan 11.9 3.0 9.1 9.1 4.5 9.7 10.6 8.1 4.0 3.1 
USA  5.5 6.7 8.1 12.2 10.4 7.9 6.5 3.9 2.8 3.1 
Malaysia 20.3 19.1 31.1 54.4 29.5 26.2 18.1 24.2 19.4 19.9 
Thailand 7.5 20.2 14.0 64.1 41.9 27.7 18.8 22.3 5.3 19.4 
 b. Direct and indirect share of  imported inputs in sectoral output b
Chine 16.1 19.4 20.3 26.0 20.9 20.5 19.9 20.1 16.9 19.6 
Japon 17.0 9.3 16.6 17.4 14.2 17.2 15.0 14.6 6.9 6.2 
Etats-Unis 9.9 10.0 13.9 16.9 16.8 13.0 10.4 9.0 5.5 5.8 
Malaisie 34.0 27.9 48.0 62.3 43.9 42.3 30.1 40.7 29.8 31.3 
Thaïlande 17.4 30.9 30.5 68.3 53.8 38.9 30.3 34.2 16.0 30.2 
Notes a/ Imports of intermediate goods of the branch, relative to the value of total output, including factorial 
services (capital and labour), based on the estimated input-output matrix in current US$; b/ direct and indirect 
content of imported inputs, based on the estimated Leontief-inverse matrix.   
Source: authors' calculation, based on IDE-Jetro data and Pula and Peltonen (2009) 
  
These indicators of direct and indirect import contents are closely related to the vertical specialization 
indices presented in Hummels, Ishii et Mu Yi (2001). 20 Assuming homogeneity of final production for 
domestic market and for export, Table 6 provides information on the import content of sectoral exports 
(or, conversely, on the domestic value added content of exports). Based on a simple average of sectoral 
values, Malaysian and Thai exports are the most intensive in imports (39% and 35%, respectively), 
followed by China (20%). Conversely, the developed economies of Japan and the USA are relatively 
closed  (13% and 11%); in other words, the domestic value added content of exports represented in 
average respectively 87% and 89% of the value of the Japanese and US sectoral exports in 2006.  
 
2) SECTORAL IMPACTS 
Supply shocks occurring in the regional sourcing network, like those which would result from a sudden 
disruption of trade due to lack of trade finance, are modelled as price shocks emanating from one of the 
five economies linked in the international I-O matrix. An arbitrary value of 30% will be used for all 
sectors. 21
 
In our simulation, all four manufacturing sectors (textile and clothing, electronic products, transport 
equipment, and other manufactures) are shocked. The simulation computes the domestic impacts and its 
transmission to the other regional partners through the imported real impact coefficient (IRSIC) as 
described page 14. As IRSIC uses the inverse-Ghosh matrix, the sectoral impacts include primary and 
secondary effects (i.e., the real transmission channel follow both direct and indirect forward linkages).  
                                                     
20 See Inomata (2008) for a discussion and extension of measurements of international fragmentation. 
21 This conservative option may underestimate the price impact of a supply shock for developed countries, as it is 
more probable that the alternate suppliers will have to be found in the domestic market, for a relatively much 
higher cost (see Annex A2 for alternative parameters).  
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As seen in Table 7, the largest secondary impacts are felt domestically. The relative effect of the shock 
on the domestic economy depends on its degree of openness, and also on the relative size of the 
originating sector in relation to the rest of the economy. Thus, despite their relative inward-oriented 
economies, a supply shock originating from the Japanese and American manufacturing sectors has a 
relatively lower impact because Japan and the US are mostly services-oriented economies. On the 
contrary, Malaysia and Thailand are less exposed to a domestic shock because of their openness and 
reliance on imported inputs. 
 
Table 8 presents a summary of the results obtained for shocks initiating from the manufacturing sectors, 
which are more integrated in international supply chains. Imported and exported supply shocks are 
expressed as a weighted average of the national increase in sectoral production costs resulting from an 
initial 30% price shock on the manufacturing sectors. Based on the existing inter and intra-industrial 
linkages, in 2000 and 2006, Japan is potentially the largest exporter of supply shocks (1.6% and 1.4%, 
respectively). Malaysia and Thailand, on the other hand, are the largest importers of such shocks, 
because of the high degree of integration of their manufacturing sectors and reliance on imported inputs 
from the other partners.  
 
The other outstanding results relate to China, with a notable increase in both forward international 
linkages and domestic backward linkages. First, China’s influence as an exporter of "shocks" (i.e., a 
supplier of intermediate goods to the other economies via the supply chain) between 2000 and 2006  has 
increased (in 2006, China shares the highest influence with Japan), while its vulnerability to an 
imported shock remained relatively stable. Second, the large increase in the overall feed-back impact of 
its domestic sector itself shows that Chinese manufacturing sectors are relying more and more on 
domestic suppliers for their industrial inputs. 
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Table 7 Transmission of an initial 30% supply-driven price shock from manufacture sectors, 2000 and 
2006 a 
(percentage) 
Origin of the shock, year. From all manufacturing sectors, 2000 b From all manufacturing sectors, 2006 b
From China to:  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture 
13.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 25.7 1.0 0.6 3.5 0.7 
Mining 
14.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 29.0 0.5 0.3 2.5 1.8 
Textile and clothing 
... 0.9 0.5 2.1 1.5 ... 1.5 0.8 3.7 2.1 
Electronics 
... 0.4 0.4 1.1 2.2 ... 0.9 0.7 2.6 2.6 
Transport equipment 
... 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6 ... 0.8 0.7 2.6 1.0 
Other manufactures 
... 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 ... 0.7 0.5 2.5 1.1 
Utilities (water, gas, elect.) 
17.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 27.8 0.4 0.3 2.9 1.7 
Construction 
30.3 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 36.1 1.0 0.5 2.5 1.8 
Trade and transport services 
18.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 28.2 0.3 0.3 2.0 0.7 
Other services 
16.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 28.6 0.4 0.3 2.9 1.9 
From Japan to:  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture 
0.3 10.3 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.8 9.5 0.1 0.7 0.9 
Mining 
0.6 13.9 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 13.8 0.1 0.5 1.8 
Textile and clothing 
1.1 ... 0.4 4.2 2.4 1.1 ... 0.2 2.9 2.5 
Electronics 
1.7 ... 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.5 ... 0.9 0.7 1.0 
Transport equipment 
1.8 ... 1.5 8.1 9.4 1.5 ... 1.0 5.6 9.0 
Other manufactures 
0.9 ... 0.4 2.4 2.2 1.1 ... 0.2 1.6 2.3 
Utilities (water, gas, elect.) 
0.7 6.7 0.1 0.7 0.5 1.1 6.5 0.1 0.5 1.7 
Construction 
1.0 14.8 0.3 2.5 2.4 1.2 14.4 0.2 1.8 2.3 
Trade and transport services 
0.6 4.7 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 4.5 0.1 0.5 1.2 
Other services 
0.6 5.3 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.1 5.1 0.1 0.5 1.7 
From USA to:  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture 
0.2 0.2 9.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 6.9 0.6 0.4 
Mining 
0.2 0.2 4.9 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 5.0 0.4 0.3 
Textile and clothing 
0.3 0.5 ... 2.2 1.4 0.4 0.5 ... 1.7 1.2 
Electronics 
0.8 0.8 ... 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.8 ... 0.4 0.3 
Transport equipment 
0.5 0.8 ... 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.8 ... 1.0 1.1 
Other manufactures 
0.4 0.4 ... 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.4 ... 1.0 0.8 
Utilities (water, gas, elect.) 
0.3 0.1 3.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 3.1 0.4 0.2 
Construction 
0.4 0.2 12.6 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.2 12.1 0.8 0.4 
Trade and transport services 
0.3 0.1 4.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 4.0 0.4 0.2 
Other services 
0.3 0.1 4.0 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.1 4.1 0.5 0.3 
 Continued .../... 
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Table 7 Transmission of an initial 30% supply-driven price shock from manufacture sectors, 2000 and 
2006 a  
 (Cont.) 
  
Origin of the shock, year. From all manufacturing sectors, 2000 From all manufacturing sectors, 2006 
From Malaysia to:  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 8.7 0.3 
Mining 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.6 
Textile and clothing 0.1 0.1 0.1 ... 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 ... 0.9 
Electronics 0.4 0.2 0.3 ... 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 ... 0.2 
Transport equipment 0.1 0.1 0.1 ... 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 ... 0.4 
Other manufactures 0.1 0.1 0.0 ... 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 ... 0.5 
Utilities (water, gas, elect.) 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 6.1 0.6 
Construction 0.1 0.1 0.0 12.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 11.7 0.6 
Trade and transport services 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.3 
Other services 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.7 
From Thailand to:  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 7.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 7.0 
Mining 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 6.2 
Textile and clothing 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.5 ... 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.4 ... 
Electronics 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 ... 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 ... 
Transport equipment 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 ... 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 ... 
Other manufactures 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 ... 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 ... 
Utilities (water, gas, elect.) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.6 
Construction 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 10.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 8.6 
Trade and transport services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 7.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 6.9 
Other services 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 6.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 5.3 
 
Notes: a/ Impact of an increase in 30% of the cost of inputs originating from the manufacturing sectors on the 
respective sectoral production costs. b/ The manufacturing sectors from where supply shocks originate are: 
Textile, Electronics, Transport Equipment, and Other Manufacturing.  
Source: authors' calculations.  
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 Table 8. Imported and exported shocks from/to the manufacturing sectors a, 2000 and 2006 
               2000     To: 
From: 
China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand Exported 
shocks  
China ... 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.0 0.6 
Japan 1.1 ... 0.7 2.1 2.6 1.6 
USA 0.5 0.6 ... 0.9 0.8 0.7 
Malaysia 0.1 0.1 0.1 ... 0.4 0.2 
Thailand 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 ... 0.1 
Imported shocks 0.4 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.2  
       
               2006      To: 
From: 
China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand Exported 
shocks b
China ... 0.8 0.5 2.6 1.5 1.4 
Japan 1.2 ... 0.5 1.5 2.7 1.4 
USA 0.5 0.6 ... 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Malaysia 0.2 0.1 0.1 ... 0.5 0.2 
Thailand 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 ... 0.2 
Imported shocks b 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.3 1.4  
Notes: a/ Weighted averages of domestic sectoral shocks; b/ Simple average of country shocks. 
Source: Calculations based on Table 7
 
Nevertheless, some patterns tend to emerge. According to the observed 2000 production structure, the 
electronics sector is much more internationally integrated than the transport equipments and textiles 
sectors, with an IRSIC (excluding domestic effects) twice higher. 22 This means that firms operating in 
the electronics sector are much more exposed to a risk of breakdown in the international supply chain.  
 
3) FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR REAL-CHANNEL TRANSMISSION OF FINANCIAL SHOCKS IN THE 
ASIA-US SUB-REGION 
One should remember than IRSIC only captures part of the shock transmission. First, it measures the 
non-disruptive supply-driven impact, maintaining constant production levels. Second, it ignores the 
secondary demand-driven impacts resulting from lower activity levels. This section explores these 
effects in the Asian-USA inter-industrial compact.  
 
i) Disruptive vs. Non-Disruptive Shocks.  
The previous simulation was based on non-disruptive supply shocks translating into a standard impact 
of 30% of prices for the affected intermediate inputs. But the countries analysed in the case study differ 
widely in their level of development, particularly regarding their technological capacity, while the 
previous sections showed large differences in the domestic value-added content of production.  
 
These characteristics have two types of implications on the effect of an imported supply shock:   
• For the relatively less developed countries, if the shock originates from an industrial country, it 
might become disruptive in case the affected firm cannot shift to another supplier, since it does 
not have the technological capacity to substitute the inputs, at any price.   
• For the most advanced industrial countries, while there is always the possibility of substituting 
domestically an intermediate input produced in a less developed country, the increase in 
                                                     
22  The 2006 update of the sectoral IO tables derives in part from the observed 2000 technical coefficients 
(Annex1). 
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production costs may be much higher than the standard 30% used in the simulation, due to, 
inter alia, the difference in the cost of factorial services. 
 
As discussed previously, the input-output framework is inappropriate to measure the first type of 
disruptive shocks because the combination of strict complementarities of inputs and forward linkages 
would progressively bring the economy to an almost complete halt. In a more realistic scenario, one can 
consider that most of the export-oriented activities would stop, generating a severe macroeconomic 
shock to the economy.  
 
For Japan and the US, the induced rise in domestic prices due to a shutdown of their Asian suppliers of 
intermediate manufacture goods is significant when differences in production costs are imputed. This is 
the case especially for the textile and clothing sectors (see Annex 3 for details on the calculation). The 
disruption of supply chains in the manufacturing sectors of the three developing Asian countries would 
lead to a 2% average increase in the price of sectoral outputs in the textile, electronics and transport 
equipment sectors.  Japan would be more affected than the US in all sectors, and the average increase in 
prices would reach 2.5% (against 1.5% for the USA). Considering that only a minority of firms engage 
in off-shoring, this average impact will fall disproportionately on a few firms probably the most 
dynamic with potentially large disruptive impact.  The results of this simulation also show the potential 
gains those firms were able to obtain by out-sourcing in the first place.  
 
ii) Demand-driven secondary impacts. 
Even in a static input-output framework, one cannot expect quantities to remain constant when prices 
change. The increase in production costs should reflect into higher output prices and, therefore, lead to 
lower final demand (considering a constant nominal income). Annex 2 illustrates these effects in the 
Asian-US context. 23  Demand-driven secondary impacts differ widely across country, but the summary 
results obtained tend to indicate that increases in output prices caused by a disruption of the supply 
chain in China would have significant implications for all the partner countries, with the exception of 
the USA. Disruptions originating in Japan also have important implications, and shock originating from 
the USA would affect more developing Asia than Japan. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The international economy is a situation where the global financial crisis which started in 2008 could 
possibly replicate the pattern of Japan’s lost decade, in particular its negative transmission mechanisms 
between the financial sectors and the real economy. In this context, the aim of the present study was to 
analyse the role of international supply chains as transmission channels of a financial shock from the 
monetary circuit into the real economy. The existence of feed-back effects between the two circuits may 
amplify the initial shock when the financial sector is facing credit-adequacy constraints. In such a case, 
credit restrictions affecting the production or the trade activity of a single firm participating in a 
production network has systemic "across the board" real and financial impacts.  In an endogenous 
money framework, a credit-crunch situation is compatible with the accumulation of liquidity in the 
monetary circuit, as counterpart of the accumulation of unexpected inventories of unfinished goods in 
the supply chain. 
 
Because individual firms are interdependent and rely on each other, either as supplier of intermediate 
goods or client for their own production, an exogenous financial shock affecting a single firm, such as 
the termination of a line of credit, reverberates through the productive chain. The transmission of the 
shock through real channels can be tracked, at macroeconomic level, by modelling input-output 
interactions. Using an international version of the input-output matrices, the paper proposes the 
calculation of an indicator of supply-driven shocks based on forward linkages.  
                                                     
23 Results are offered only for illustration, since a complete modelling of the supply-demand interactions would 
require a general equilibrium framework. 
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Assuming that the initial credit-crunch shock that constrains the productive capacity of some individual 
firms is not disruptive at macroeconomic level, the intensity of the real sectoral shock transmission is 
proportional to the direct and indirect increases in production costs. In the price space, the initial supply 
shocks are transmitted through the Ghosh matrix, while the transmission of the secondary demand 
shocks responds to the Leontief methodology.  
 
As the initial monetary shock reverberates through the productive chains and affects final demand, 
more and more firms will face difficulties in completing their production plans or selling their output. 
These disruptions occurring in the real economy feed-back into the monetary circuit. The disruption of 
the productive chain and the building-up of undesired stocks impede the expected destruction of money 
and determine the accumulation of outstanding loans as well as a further downgrading of the exposed 
firms. Since the downgrading of an indebted individual firm affects the capital adequacy ratio of its 
banker, both flows and stocks are affected in the monetary circuit and all firms see their access to credit 
potentially restricted. Thus a limited credit shock initiating in the monetary circuit will be spread across 
various sectors and various countries through the supply chain, and then will feed-back into the 
monetary circuit with amplified effects. 
 
The paper suggests that if banks were originally operating at the limit of their institutional capacity, 
defined by the capital adequacy ratio, and if assets are priced to market, then a resonance effect 
amplifies the back and forth transmission between real and monetary circuits, leading to strongly non 
linear results. The chaotic behaviour of the international financial system at the end of 2008, and its dire 
consequences on the real economy observed in 2009, are examples of such resonance and amplification. 
In that light, the present crisis should provide an opportunity to address problems of macro-prudential 
pro-cyclicality to minimize the risks of boom and bust cycles initiating from the financial sector. 
 
The paper illustrates the proposed methodology by computing a supply-driven indicator (IRSIC) and 
the resulting demand-driven impacts on five interconnected economies of different characteristics: 
China, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and the United States. Calculations are based on the international 
Input-Output matrices prepared on the basis of 2000 data, and an estimate for 2006. Results indicate 
that the real transmission effect through the international supply-chain linking firms among these 
economies were heterogeneous across countries and across sectors.  
 
The largest impacts, as expected, are felt domestically. The relative size of the shock on the domestic 
economy depends on its degree of openness, and also on the relative size of the originating sector in 
relation to the rest of the economy. Based on the existing inter- and intra-industrial linkages, Japan was 
the largest exporter of potential supply shock, while Malaysia and Thailand were the most vulnerable to 
such shocks, because of the high degree of vertical integration of their manufacturing sector. Between 
2000 and 2006, China registered a notable increase in both international forward linkages and domestic 
backward linkages, which increased her influence as an exporter of "shocks" while her vulnerability to 
an imported shock remained relatively stable. Indeed, the Chinese manufacturing sectors are relying 
more and more on domestic suppliers for their industrial inputs. 
 
The methodology used to estimate real transmission effects is fairly easy to implement. The Leontief 
and Ghosh models are very powerful statistical tools, which allowed us to obtain interpretable results 
quickly. Contrary to what was believed previously, we also showed that it is possible to model jointly, 
albeit not simultaneously, both forward and backward supply shocks in both price and quantity spaces. 
While intensive in data, the method is quite straightforward and the increasing availability of 
international I-O data for most OECD and large emerging economies should allow to identify the real 
sectoral impacts of a financial shock on all the real sectors on our globalized economy. 
 
The main weakness is on the normative side. This partial modelling approach remains eclectic and does 
not provide easily for a simultaneous and integrated modelling of both physical and financial flows. It is 
intended only as a tracking device, and do not provide information on economic implications nor 
welfare changes. The paper also identifies the macroeconomic and sectoral determinants of the 
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credit-migration matrices, but falls short of integrating them into the monetary circuit. Incorporating the 
various micro, sectoral and macroeconomic dimensions into computable general equilibrium models 
would be an option, but these models have limitations in their financial components. In particular, the 
reductive assumption of exogenous money typical of CGEs would have to be abandoned for the 
endogenous approach characterising monetary circuits.  
 
_________________________ 
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ANNEX 1: Updating the IO Matrices 
 
 
The Asian IO tables compiled by JETRO’s Institute of Developing Economies that we use in our 
simulations contain data from year 2000 and, at the time of writing, these tables are the latest available. 
World trade value has more than doubled since 2000, while merchandise exports from Asia increased 
even more rapidly (125%), making it necessary to update the information. Thanks to the procedure 
developed by Pula and Peltonen (2009), we have been able to estimate and updated IO table for year 
2006 by incorporating changes in trade data between 2000 and 2006.  
 
Our starting point was the intermediate demand block compiled by Pula and Peltonen, which contains 
changes in intermediary trade, aggregated at country level between 2000 and 2006. This block covers 
all intermediate inputs (domestic + imported) as well as value added, freight, insurance and import 
duties. To obtain the 2006 value in a specific cell, Pula and Peltonen have multiplied the 2000 value in 
this cell by the nominal growth rate in 2000-2006.  
 
More precisely: 
- Growth rates of imported inputs were calculated by using two data sources – National 
Accounts statistics (which includes total trade of goods and services) and COMTRADE data 
(which provides information on bilateral flows by reporters).  
- Growth rates of value added in each country were taken from National Accounts 
statistics. 
- Growth rates of freight, insurance and import duties are also based on National 
Accounts statistics.  
- Total output was estimated by applying the output/VA ratio in the manufacturing 
sector to the total economy’s value added. . 
- Domestic intermediate consumption was calculated by subtracting updated values for 
imported intermediate inputs, value added, freight, insurance and import duties from updated 
total output. 24 
 
We have adapted this intermediate demand block to our study by reducing the number of countries 
down to only five (consolidating the matrix by adding imports from the five other countries to the 
imports from the rest of the world) and by distributing freight and insurance in each country among the 
different sources of imported inputs to obtain CIF values. 25
 
Starting from Pula and Peltonen’s aggregated country-level update, our next step was to impute updated 
sectoral values. For each country, this was done by estimating the relative contribution of each sector in 
the total 2000-2006 increase of intermediary trade. On the basis of sectoral 2000 and 2006 value added 
data in a selection of six sectors (agriculture, mining and manufacturing, construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, transport, other activities), we derived the shares of each of these sectors in the evolution of 
total value added. 26  These values were rearranged to calculate a sectoral table, by dividing and 
reallocating the initial six sectors among the ad-hoc ten sectors disaggregation used in our study, 
depending on the weight of each of the ten sectors in the 2000 total output of each country (see Table 
A1.1).  
 
 
                                                     
24 Full methodology details on the intermediate demand block can be found in Appendix A.2 of Pula and Peltonen 
(2009). 
25 The value of duties and taxes was also redistributed in order to compute the 2000-2006 growth rate consistently 
with the 2000 aggregated tables. 
26 Source: UN Statistical Division website. 
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Table A1.1 Estimated sectoral contribution in the increase of total value added, 2000-2006 (percent) 
 
 
A
griculture 
M
ining 
Textile 
Electronics 
Transport 
Equipm
ent 
O
ther 
M
anufact. 
Electricity 
W
ater G
as 
C
onstructn 
Trade 
Transport 
O
ther  
Services 
China 9.2 7.6 3.6 4.4 2.0 18.1 9.1 5.7 4.3 35.9 
Japan 5.4 0.1 0.7 5.0 4.6 19.0 2.1 19.9 10.4 32.7 
USA  9.1 1.2 0.9 3.4 4.8 18.4 2.4 1.1 6.3 52.5 
Malaysia 13.3 7.1 1.3 16.4 1.7 17.9 2.9 2.9 6.1 30.4 
Thailand 0.8 4.4 0.7 0.9 0.4 2.7 11.6 5.7 4.6 68.2 
Source: Authors' calculation on the basis on UNSD national account data. 
 
Based on the hypothesis of invariant coefficients for the supply-use table between 2000 and 2006, we 
have used these shares to estimate sectoral gross output and total intermediate consumption. Then, we 
proceeded to distribute sectorally the increases of input trade in China, Japan, the US, Malaysia and 
Thailand (based on observed trade statistics). The domestic sectoral intermediate consumption among 
is obtained as a residual from the total intermediate consumption and imported inputs estimated for each 
sector. 
 
ANNEX 2: Incorporating secondary demand-driven impacts   
 
A complete simulation of the transmission of supply-driven shocks should ideally include quantities 
effects, even when production plans are unrestricted. One way of introducing quantitative effects in our 
initial framework is to revert to the initial Leontief demand-driven approach, noting that the 
supply-driven shock will eventually affect demand.  
 
Indeed, the exogenous increase in production costs will reflect into higher prices for a series of final 
products, and a decrease in their demand. Noting that ISRIC is the percentage price increase in output 
prices, the resulting negative demand-driven secondary shocks could be modelled using traditional 
Leontief model (final demand impulses), in the following way: 
 
ΔQ2' =(I-L)-1 . ΔD         [2] 
with 
ΔQ2' : demand-driven secondary shocks  
ΔD : change in final demand due to higher prices. 
 (I-L)-1: Leontief inverse 
ΔD = ΔP ● E         [3] 
E : column vector of price elasticity  
ΔP : column vector of price shocks      
● : Hadomard product 
 
Remember from equation [1] that  %ΔP/P = 'ISRIC'. 
   
The secondary demand effects [2] are proportional to the initial supply-driven shock as measured by 
ISRIC  [1]. Note that while  ΔQ and ISRIC in equation [1] were price effects (Ghosh models),  ΔQ2'  is 
a quantity effect (Leontief models). Nevertheless, price and quantity dimensions are not independent 
and the secondary demand effects —a drop in demand (ΔQ2')— will, in turn, induce a downward 
correction in prices, thus reducing somewhat the initial supply-driven price shock.  
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In order to avoid this loop effect, Papadas and Dahl (1999) have suggested splitting the I-O matrix into 
exogenous and endogenous sectors, and have captured the backward sectoral impacts of supply-driven 
multipliers only on the non-exogenized sectors. When the production of sector n is altered exogenously, 
the backward effects are felt by the sectoral outputs (different from n) which are used as inputs by n27.  
 
The discussion on the relative merits of alternative approaches falls beyond the limited scope of this 
paper. For our present purpose, it is sufficient to keep in mind that the secondary demand impacts are 
proportional (through the price elasticities and the Leontief-inverse) to the initial supply-driven price 
effects as measured by ISRIC. As already mentioned, the simultaneous modelling of the structural 
interactions induced by changes in prices would ideally have to be realized using computable 
general-equilibrium models, something which falls outside the objectives of this paper. 
 
• Application to the Asia-USA example.  
 
Demand shocks derived from the increases in output price presented in Table 7 are estimated using 
traditional Leontief model (final demand impulses), as described in equation [2].  As the price elasticity 
for most products tends to cluster around 1.0, a unitary elasticity is a commonly used rule of thumb. A 
unitary elasticity here means that the negative shock in quantity demanded is equal to the resulting 
increase in prices (IRSIC), itself higher than the initial 30% increase in unit costs of substitute 
intermediate inputs.  
 
Results presented in Table A2.1 are based on the sectoral impacts on other countries resulting from an 
initial supply shock affecting all the manufacturing sectors of a given supplier country, as shown in 
Table 7. Secondary demand results may nevertheless differ somewhat, based on the relative strength of 
backward linkages in affected economies.  
 
The summary results (South-East panel of  Table A2.1) indicate that a disruption of the supply chain in 
China has potentially large recessive implications for the partner countries (in average over the four 
partners, the drop in demand resulting from the price hike could reach over 10% in manufacture). 
North-East panel indicates that all partners excepted USA would be affected, Malaysia being the most 
vulnerable. Disruptions originating in Japan also have important implications, especially for transport 
equipment. Thailand would be the most affected by a shock originating in Japan. A supply shock 
originating from the USA would affect proportionally more developing Asian countries than Japan. 
                                                     
27 It should be noted that Papadas and Dahl believed that "there is no satisfactory way to account simultaneously 
for the impacts of primary backward and forward effects, and thus their secondary ones." This may be true in 
the quantity space, but we have demonstrated that it is possible to model sequentially both forward and 
backward effects by restricting forward supply-driven effects to the price space, and demand-driven backward 
effect to the quantity space. The link between both spaces is provided by the elasticity equation [3].    
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Table A2.1 Secondary demand shock in response to an initial 30% increase in the price of imported 
manufactured intermediate inputs, 2006 a (percent) 
 
  Imported from China to:    Imported from Japan to:   
  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture ... -5.4 -1.7 -11.7 -10.7  -3.5 ... -0.8 -3.5 -8.3 
Mining ... -6.3 -1.9 -13.5 -7.6  -3.8 ... -0.9 -8.0 -4.8 
Textile and clothing ... -15.2 -1.9 -13.8 -6.6  -4.1 ... -0.6 -5.1 -4.8 
Electronics ... -9.1 -3.0 -13.5 -17.7  -5.0 ... -2.0 -3.8 -5.3 
Transport equipment ... -3.0 -1.0 -7.3 -4.3  -5.4 ... -1.7 -8.6 -17.7 
Other manufactures ... -6.7 -2.0 -23.0 -11.9  -6.2 ... -0.9 -7.4 -9.5 
Utilities  ... -3.1 -1.0 -13.1 -4.0  -3.6 ... -0.4 -3.8 -3.5 
Construction ... -1.3 -0.7 -3.9 -1.8  -1.6 ... -0.3 -2.2 -2.3 
Trade, transport services ... -3.0 -1.1 -17.1 -7.1  -6.3 ... -0.6 -5.8 -4.9 
Other services ... -1.3 -0.7 -6.2 -2.9  -2.2 ... -0.2 -1.9 -2.6 
  Imported from USA to:  Imported from Malaysia to:   
  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture -2.0 -1.5 ... -2.0 -3.4  -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 ... -3.0 
Mining -2.0 -1.4 ... -2.3 -1.1  -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 ... -1.5 
Textile and clothing -2.3 -1.6 ... -5.5 -4.4  -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 ... -1.6 
Electronics -3.7 -4.2 ... -5.4 -7.0  -1.1 -0.5 -0.3 ... -0.7 
Transport equipment -3.2 -3.6 ... -2.3 -3.6  -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 ... -1.3 
Other manufactures -4.0 -2.0 ... -4.3 -3.8  -1.1 -0.4 -0.1 ... -2.4 
Utilities  -2.0 -1.1 ... -2.9 -0.9  -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 ... -1.2 
Construction -0.7 -0.3 ... -1.1 -0.4  -0.3 -0.1 0.0 ... -0.7 
Trade, transport services -4.0 -0.9 ... -5.3 -2.0  -1.1 -0.2 -0.1 ... -1.4 
Other services -1.1 -0.4 ... -1.4 -0.5  -0.4 -0.1 0.0 ... -1.0 
  Imported from Thailand to:  Summary : average sectoral shocks originating from:b
  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand  China Japan USA Malaysia Thailand 
Agriculture -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -1.3 ...  -7.4 -4.1 -2.2 -1.0 -0.5 
Mining -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -1.6 ...  -7.3 -4.4 -1.7 -0.6 -0.6 
Textile and clothing -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -2.0 ...  -9.4 -3.6 -3.4 -0.7 -0.8 
Electronics -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.7 ...  -10.8 -4.0 -5.1 -0.7 -0.4 
Transport equipment -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 -1.3 ...  -3.9 -8.3 -3.2 -0.6 -0.6 
Other manufactures -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 -2.3 ...  -10.9 -6.0 -3.5 -1.0 -0.9 
Utilities -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3 ...  -5.3 -2.8 -1.7 -0.5 -0.5 
Construction -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.7 ...  -1.9 -1.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 
Trade, transport services -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -1.4 ...  -7.1 -4.4 -3.0 -0.7 -0.6 
Other services -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 ...   -2.8 -1.7 -0.9 -0.4 -0.3 
 
Notes: a/ Assuming an uniform 1.0 price elasticity of demand; b/ simple average of sectoral effects to other 
partners. 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
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ANNEX 3. Simulating a disruptive supply shock in the Asian-US sub-region 
 
The simulation used in the paper is based on the possibility of (imperfect) substitution between 
domestic and imported inputs for all participants in the supply chain. Nevertheless, for a country at an 
earlier stage of industrialization, a shock originating from an industrial country might become 
disruptive if the domestic firm is totally dependent of the international productive network, or when the 
domestic manufacturing does not have the technological capacity to substitute the inputs, at any price.   
 
The disruptive shock created by a brutal disruption of manufactured inputs imported from Japan and the 
US would probably stop entirely most of the firms relying on these inputs, and in particular, most of 
their export oriented manufacturing sectors. As discussed previously, the input-output framework 
defined by the Ghosh matrix is inappropriate to measure such disruptive shocks in the quantity space, 
because of the strict complementarities of inputs (corresponding to a null Armington elasticity of 
substitution between imported and domestic inputs).  
 
Because of forward linkages, an economy based on strictly complementary production factors would 
progressively slow down to a complete stop as the supply constraints will progressively extend to all 
sectors. A more realistic scenario is one where the export oriented activities stop when the required 
inputs for processing are no more available. 
  
For the most advanced industrial countries, while there is always the possibility of substituting 
domestically an intermediate input produced in a less developed country, the increase in production 
costs may be much higher than the standard 30% used in the simulation, due to, inter alia, the difference 
in the cost of factorial services, especially labour. 
 
Our back-of-the-envelope calculation of the potential increase in sectoral production cost is based on a 
single international price for tradable goods and a pricing of non-traded factorial services based on the 
equivalence of purchasing power parity. The purchasing power parity ratio between the developed and 
developing countries is about 0.40; in other words, factorial services are 150% more expensive in the 
US and Japan than in the developing Asian countries (Table A3.1). 
TableA3.1 Ratio of PPP conversion factor to market exchange rate, 2005 
Ratio of PPP conversion 
factor to market 
exchange rate, 2005 
Based on 
US dollar 
Based on Japanese 
Yen 
USA 1.00 0.85 
Japan 1.18 1.00 
China 0.42 0.36 
Malaysia 0.46 0.39 
Thailand 0.40 0.34 
Source: International Comparison Program: "New purchasing power parity estimates from the 2005 International 
Comparison Program", World Bank. 
 
On the other hand, the direct share of domestic value added (the remuneration of factorial services) in 
the value of production in Japan and the USA was about 53% in 2006. Thus the expected increase in 
input prices, when shifting production from a typical developing Asian country supplier to a domestic 
(Japanese or US) supplier should be 80% (0.53 x 150%). This shock is applied simultaneously to the 
cost of all manufactured inputs previously imported from China, Malaysia and Thailand by Japan and 
the USA (Table A3.2). 
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Table A3.2 Combined disruptive shock from the manufacturing sectors of Asian developing 
countries (percentage) 
 Japan USA 
Agriculture 3.2 1.8 
Mining 1.6 1.0 
Textile and clothing 4.6 2.8 
Electronics 3.4 2.7 
Transport equipment 3.1 2.1 
Other manufactures 2.4 1.5 
Utilities (water, gas, elect.) 1.3 1.0 
Construction 3.1 1.5 
Trade and transport services 1.0 0.8 
Other services 1.1 1.0 
Note: Expected increase in sectoral cost of production following a disruptive shock from China, Malaysia and 
Thailand manufacturing sectors. 
Sources: Authors' calculations. 
 
The induced rise in output prices is significant, especially in the sectors of textile, electronics and 
transport equipments, where the disruption of supply chains in the manufacturing sectors of the three 
developing Asian countries would lead to a 2% increase in the average price of sectoral outputs in the 
ex-importing countries. Japan is more affected the US in all sectors, especially for textile and clothing, 
construction and agriculture, showing her greater reliance on imported inputs and fragmented 
production. 
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